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ABSTRACT
Background. Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) are used in impact evaluation
in a range of fields. However, despite calls for their greater use in environmental
management, their use to evaluate landscape scale interventions remains rare. Payments
for Ecosystem Services (PES) incentivise land users to manage land to provide
environmental benefits. We present the first RCT evaluation of a PES program aiming
to improve water quality. Watershared is a program which incentivises landowners
to avoid deforestation and exclude cattle from riparian forests. Using this unusual
landscape-scale experiment we explore the efficacy ofWatershared at improving water
quality, and draw lessons for future RCT evaluations of landscape-scale environmental
management interventions.
Methods. One hundred and twenty-nine communities in the Bolivian Andes were
randomly allocated to treatment (offered Watershared agreements) or control (not
offered agreements) following baseline data collection (including Escherichia coli
contamination in most communities) in 2010. We collected end-line data in 2015.
Using our end-line data, we explored the extent to which variables associated with
the intervention (e.g. cattle exclusion, absence of faeces) predict water quality locally.
We then investigated the efficacy of the intervention at improving water quality at the
landscape scale using the RCT. This analysis was done in two ways; for the subset of
communities for whichwe have both baseline and end-line data from identical locations
we used difference-in-differences (matching on baseline water quality), for all sites we
compared control and treatment at end-line controlling for selected predictors of water
quality.
Results. The presence of cattle faeces inwater adversely affectedwater quality suggesting
excluding cattle has a positive impact on water quality locally. However, both the
matched difference-in-differences analysis and the comparison between treatment and
control communities at end-line suggestedWatershared was not effective at reducing E.
coli contamination at the landscape scale. Uptake ofWatershared agreements was very
low and the most important land from a water quality perspective (land around water
intakes) was seldom enrolled.
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Discussion. Although excluding cattlemayhave a positive local impact onwater quality,
higher uptake and better targeting would be required to achieve a significant impact on
the quality of water consumed in the communities. Although RCTs potentially have an
important role to play in building the evidence base for approaches such as PES, they are
far from straightforward to implement. In this case, the randomised trial was not central
to concluding thatWatershared had not produced a landscape scale impact. We suggest
that this RCT provides valuable lessons for future use of randomised experiments to
evaluate landscape-scale environmental management interventions.
Subjects Conservation Biology, Coupled Natural and Human Systems, Natural Resource
Management, Environmental Impacts
Keywords Conservation effectiveness, Payments for watershed services, Water quality, Payments
for Environmental Services, Bolivia, Randomised Control Trial, Evidence based conservation,
Experimental evaluation, Impact evaluation, Escherichia coli
INTRODUCTION
Whether an intervention is effective at delivering the outcomes expected is a key question
for evidence-based policy making (e.g., White, 2013). This question is highly pertinent
in the field of conservation and environmental management as awareness grows of the
amount of money that has been spent on interventions with limited understanding of their
effectiveness (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Bowler et al., 2012; Waeber et al., 2016; Salzman
et al., 2018). As a result, conservation effectiveness is being widely discussed in the academic
literature (Baylis et al., 2016; Börner et al., 2016; Sutherland & Wordley, 2017), the policy
literature (Puri et al., 2016; Duchelle, Wunder & Martius, 2018), conservation journalism
(Dasgupta, Gaworecki & Burivalova, 2018) and the mainstream media (Mooney, 2016).
Randomised Control Trials (RCTs), in which experimental units are randomly allocated
to treatment or control groups, allow the creation of robust counterfactuals from which
to infer what would have happened in the absence of the intervention (e.g. Rubin, 1974).
RCTs are widely used in many areas of public policy including medicine, education, and
development economics (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013; Council of Economic Advisers,
2014). Although small-scale RCTs have been a mainstay of applied ecological experiments
for decades, there are very few examples of RCTs of large-scale environmental management
interventions, and there have been calls for their increased use (Greenstone & Gayer, 2009;
Samii et al., 2014; Baylis et al., 2016; Börner et al., 2016; Börner et al., 2017).
Payments for Ecosystem Services (or Payments for Environmental Services—the terms
are largely interchangeable (Wunder, 2015)) translate external, non-market values of the
environment into financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services.
The focus of many PES programs in Latin America (Martin-Ortega, Ojea & Roux, 2013;
Grima et al., 2016), and to a lesser extent in Asia and Africa, e.g., (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015)
is the increase or maintenance of supply of good quality water. At least 1.8 billion people
still rely on drinking water sources contaminated with faecal matter (Bain et al., 2014a).
Where sources lack adequate physical or chemical treatment the quality of drinking water
is influenced by land use and ecosystem management around and upstream of those water
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sources. Hence provision of clean water can be considered as an ecosystem service or as
a precursor to multiple ecosystem services benefiting society (Keeler et al., 2012). Despite
the increasing number of PES programs in operation, there are very few robust evaluations
of the extent to which they deliver the outcomes they seek to supply (Pattanayak, Wunder
& Ferraro, 2010;Miteva, Pattanayak & Ferraro, 2012; Naeem et al., 2015; Baylis et al., 2016;
Börner et al., 2017; Ferraro, 2017; Salzman et al., 2018). We know of only a single published
Randomised Control Trial of a PES (evaluating the impact of a program in Uganda
on deforestation; Jayachandran et al., 2017) and none evaluating the impact of PES on
water quality.
Gastrointestinal illnesses caused by consumption of contaminated water are a major
cause of mortality and morbidity in the developing world (Prüss-Ustün et al., 2014).
Escherichia coli is a bacterium that lives only in the guts of warm-blooded animals (Leclerc
et al., 2001). While some strains of E. coli are pathogenic, the majority are not but are
useful indicators of faecal contamination and the presence of other pathogens (Ashbolt,
Grabow & Snozzi, 2001). Sources of faecal contamination may include faulty sewerage
systems and leaking septic tanks (Richards et al., 2016), open defecation (Spears, Ghosh &
Cumming, 2013), or the presence of wildlife (Ahmed et al., 2012). However, a major source
of contamination is the presence of domestic livestock, particularly free-roaming cattle
(Crane et al., 1983). Therefore, cattle exclusion has been practiced as a means of reducing
faecal contamination of watercourses. In the UK, for example, the Good Agricultural and
Environmental Conditions standard 1 requires farmers in receipt of certain subsidies to
maintain buffer strips and refrain from spreadingmanure within areas close to water bodies
(GOV.UK, 2016). There is evidence of such actions being effective at significantly reducing
E. coli concentration and other faecal contamination of water supplies (Sunohara et al.,
2012). However, many uncertainties remain about the extent to which these interventions,
incentivised via a PES program, can deliver consistent benefits in water quality at the
landscape scale.
The Bolivian non-governmental organization Fundación Natura Bolivia (Natura) began
using in-kind incentives to encourage conservation in the Andean region of Bolivia in
2003. Their program, now known as Watershared, aims to slow forest loss and protect
the quality of water available to communities through providing modest development
support in exchange for avoiding deforestation and excluding livestock from riparian
forest (Bottazzi et al., 2018). Although Natura does not characterise Watershared as PES
(Asquith, 2016), the program meets the most widely used PES definition (Wunder, 2015):
‘‘voluntary transactions between service users and service providers that are conditional
on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite services’’. As of
2016, 210,000 hectares of forest owned by 4,500 households were under Watershared
conservation agreements (Asquith, 2016).
Given the growing interest in evaluating the effectiveness of different conservation
approaches,Natura established aRandomisedControl Trial (RCT) to evaluateWatershared.
One hundred and twenty-nine communities were randomly allocated to control (not
offered Watershared agreements) or treatment groups (offered agreements). We use this
unique setup to investigate the effectiveness of the intervention at delivering improvements
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inmicrobial water quality.We address three interconnected questions: (1)Do the features of
Watershared agreements (e.g., cattle exclusion, absence of faeces) have a measurable impact
on water quality at a site, accounting for other predictors? (2) Did the implementation of
Watershared in treatment communities result in an improvement in water quality relative
to control communities? (3) What lessons does the Watershared RCT evaluation offer for
the wider use of experiments to evaluate the impact of conservation interventions at the
landscape scale?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Context and RCT design
This article focuses on the Watershared intervention in the Río Grande Valles Cruceños
Natural Integrated Management Area (Spanish acronym ANMI Río Grande-Valles
Cruceños), a protected area of 7,339 km2 in theAndean region of the SantaCruzDepartment
in eastern Bolivia (Fig. 1). Forests in this area are perceived locally as contributing
to providing high-quality water for human consumption and irrigation, despite the
mixed scientific evidence on this topic (Bruijnzeel, 2004; Ponette-González et al., 2015).
Gastrointestinal illnesses are endemic; for example, in 2015 the health centre ofMoroMoro,
a community of approximately 800 people, treated 236 cases of diarrhoea (information
from Servicio Nacional Integral de Salud, Centro de Salud Moro Moro, obtained 4th April
2016). Faecal contamination from cattle is widely considered an important contributor
to the high prevalence of these diseases as the traditional farming system involves cattle
grazing freely within the forests from where most communities take their water. While
some communities have rudimentary sedimentation and filtration systems, these are of
limited effectiveness and often become clogged with sediment after each rainfall event.
Chlorination or other chemical treatment is rare.
In 2010, 129 communities within the Río Grande-Valles Cruceños protected area were
selected for inclusion in a Randomised Control Trial (Fig. 1). Consent to randomisation
was granted by community leaders on the understanding that the intervention would
subsequently be implemented in all communities (this general roll-out was conducted
in 2016). Communities were randomly allocated to control (64 of these communities
in which conservation agreements were not offered) or treatment (65 communities in
which agreements were offered) groups following stratification based on municipality,
community size, and estimated cattle density. The RCT was not blinded as participants
unavoidably knew whether they belonged to a treatment or control community. However,
in order to avoid observer bias effects during data collection, those conducting water quality
monitoring did not know which communities belonged to the treatment or control group.
Individuals belonging to treatment communities were offered the chance to conserve
land belonging to them under Watershared agreements (see Bottazzi et al. 2018 for more
detail on the Watershared program) and received education on the importance of cattle
exclusion and forest conservation for the maintenance of water quality and quantity.
Individuals belonging to control communities received the environmental education only.
Natura offered landowners in treatment communities three-year conservation agreements
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Figure 1 Map of the study area. (A) Locations of the 65 treatment communities (Watershared agree-
ments offered) and 64 control communities (Watershared agreements not offered) within the Río Grande
Valles Cruceños Natural Integrated Management Area (ANMI RG-VC). (B) Location of the ANMI RG-VC
protected area within Bolivia.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5753/fig-1
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to conserve upstream forest and exclude cattle from riparian forest in return for in-kind
incentives such as fruit trees, barbed wire, or irrigation materials. Participants could enrol
their land in one of three kinds of agreements (for details see Table S1). In this paper
we only consider level 1 agreements, in which landowners were offered $10/hectare/year
in-kind equivalent (plus the equivalent of $100 regardless of the size of the area enrolled)
in return for conserving forested land within 100 m of a watercourse and excluding cattle
from these areas. Landowners were offered the opportunity to enrol their land twice per
year, beginning in August 2011. Compliance monitoring and distribution of the in-kind
compensations was conducted yearly. A recent analysis suggests that 31% of the area of
level 1 agreements resulted in additional conservation (i.e., cattle were kept out of land
which otherwise they would have been allowed in; Bottazzi et al., 2018).
Sampling strategy
Our analyses are based upon two rounds of monitoring of the quality of water intended
for human consumption. A baseline was taken between February and July of 2010 by the
NGO Natura before the sites were allocated to control or treatment groups. The allocation
to control or treatment was not stratified by measured water quality at the sites, and the
baseline data was not otherwise used until our team started work on the project in 2013.
A more detailed end-line monitoring round was undertaken by our team from Bangor
University in collaboration with Natura between March and May of 2015, i.e., following
completion of the first signed agreements. In the end-line we had more stringent protocols
and also measured a number of additional potential indicators of water quality.
The communities within the RCT are small (maximum number of households is
123; Bottazzi et al., 2017) with diverse water supply systems. Some have a single water
intake, others multiple intakes and in a few cases no functional intake at all (community
members take water directly from streams or other water bodies). Resource and logistical
constraints meant that not all intakes and taps could be sampled and so the tap supplying
the community’s school, along with the intake supplying that tap, were taken as sampling
sites based on the assumption that these would have the greatest importance for health
(Fig. 2). In cases where the community had no school, we monitored at the intake which
supplied the greatest number of households and a representative tap fed by that intake.
In the cases in which the community had no functional water system at all, we took a
sample in the water body where the greatest number of households collected their water.
Thus most communities had two site measurements (intake and tap), whereas a few (those
lacking an intake) only had one, in a few communities two intakes were measured. In this
paper we refer to the combination of an intake and a tap (or the location where households
collected water where an intake is not present) as a water system.
In 2010 the randomisation process assigned 129 communities to control or treatment
group. Independently technicians from Natura monitored water quality in 120 of these
communities. In the 2015 end-line we monitored 118 communities that were part of
the RCT plus an additional six communities not in the RCT. Two of the RCT sites were
excluded from the end-line analysis as their water system was supplied from rainfall
collected from roofs and therefore cattle could not affect water quality. Water quality was
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Figure 2 Schematic of an example community with two water intakes showing locations of intake and
tap sampling sites.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5753/fig-2
measured at each site (see below). In 2015 we also recorded other characteristics of the site
which may predict water quality. Table S2 summarises the sample size for each analysis.
The Natura technicians who took water measurements in 2010 recorded the location
with a handheld GPS. However when we returned in 2015 it was not always possible to
confirm that we were at the same water intake (GPS readings in forest can be inaccurate). In
addition, between baseline data collection in 2010 and our team’s visit in 2015, the location
of both water intakes and the main tap serving the community had changed in a number
of sites. As a result, for only 83 sites in 47 communities were we 100% confident that had
measured water quality at the same location between 2010 and 2015 (Table S2). The fact
that end-line data from the same location was not available from all sites is somewhat
analogous to the common problem of attrition due to loss to follow up in clinical trials
(Jüni, Altman & Egger, 2001). However as we still took an end-line measure (although as
we could not be sure the location was identical and therefore the data were not included in
the difference–in-differences analysis) we do not use the term attrition in this paper. It is
also important to note that a few of the water intakes could not be unambiguously assigned
to control or treatment (for example there are two cases in which one intake supplied two
communities, one of which was treatment and the other control); these have been excluded
from the RCT analysis.
Water quality monitoring
The principal metric recorded was E. coli colony forming unit concentration (CFUs) in
water samples. E. coli concentration, along with that of other non-E. coli bacteria belonging
to the coliform group, was quantified using the Coliscan Easygel method (Micrology Labs,
Goshen, IN, USA). Coliscan Easygel allows enumeration of coliforms as after incubation
E. coli colonies appear purple, blue-purple or dark blue due to metabolism of both
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beta-galactosidase and beta-glucuronidase. Other non-E. coli coliforms are pink based
upon metabolism of beta-galactosidase only. Colonies of a blue–green or sky blue color
(metabolism of beta-glucuronidase only) and white colonies were not counted (Micrology
Labs, 2016). The Easygel method (which uses only five ml of water per sample) does not
comply with the World Health Organization’s 100 ml standard for coliform monitoring
but studies have shown that it is reasonably robust and not susceptible to false negatives
(Chuang, Trottier & Murcott, 2011). This method had been selected by Natura due to the
logistical challenges with using alternative methods such as membrane filtration in the
remote and low-resource context of the study area (many sites are reachable only with
difficult drives and long walks). When we modified the protocol in 2015 (to overcome
some of the limitations of the 2010 protocol), we elected to retain the method for the same
reason and to ensure data were comparable as possible.
In 2010, one sample was placed into sterile Coliscan Easygel sampling flasks (35 ml)
taking care to avoid any external contamination. Up to two days later (but normally on
the same day) the Natura team then inoculated Easygel Petri dishes using 5 ml of the water
from each flask. After solidification the Petri dishes were sealed and incubated at ambient
temperature for 48 h, after which numbers of E. coli and other non-E. coli coliform CFUs
were counted.
In 2015, four separate samples were taken using sterile Coliscan Easygel sampling flasks
(35 ml each) and placed on ice within 1 h of sampling. Within 6 h of sampling (although
generally within 4) we produced Easygel Petri dishes using five ml of water from each flask
as inoculum. After solidification we sealed the Petri dishes and incubated them for 24 h at
35–37 ◦C in a portable incubator (NQ28 model, Darwin Chambers, St Louis, MO, USA).
In locations where no mains electricity was available we maintained a constant incubation
temperature through use of a 12 V vehicle power supply or supply from a car battery. After
incubation we counted E. coli and other non-E. coli coliform CFUs.
In 2015 we alsomeasured in each site a number of physico-chemical parameters of water:
temperature, dissolved oxygen in mg/l and per cent of saturation value, pH, salinity and
conductivity in each site with an HQ40d portable multi-parameter meter and IntelliCAL
LDO101, PHC101 and CDC401 rugged probes respectively (HACH Company, Loveland,
CO, USA). We measured turbidity in formazin attenuation units through the use of a
DR/850 colorimeter (HACH Company, Loveland, CO, USA). Additionally, at the intake
sites, we recorded other variables that may predict E. coli concentration, including the
presence or absence of cattle (judged based upon presence of faeces, hoof prints, or cattle
paths recently used) and the presence or absence of cattle faeces in the riparian forest, in
the water, or on banks. Some were recorded at the intake itself and others along a 10 m
transect upstream (uphill in the case of intakes in springs) of the intake. Details of all
monitored variables are available in Table S3.
We used Natura’s community database to determine which intakes supplied treatment
or control communities (we did not have this information when conducting field sampling
to avoid any observer bias effects). We used GIS software (ArcGIS 10.2, ESRI, Redlands,
CA, USA) and Natura’s shapefiles to calculate the percentage of eligible land in each
community which was enrolled inWatershared agreements (we compared this percentage
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between treatment and control communities), and which monitored intakes fell within
land enrolled inWatershared agreements. We used data held byNatura to confirmwhich of
these intakes were in agreements which had been compliant with the agreements according
to Natura’s observations. In a number of the earliest sites monitored during 2015 we
accidentally disturbed the sediment in the water intake while taking samples; sites in which
this happened were recorded as such.
Balance achieved in the allocation of control and treatment
At baseline Natura collected a number of variables at the community level. Two of these
(mean number of cows per person in the community, and number of households in the
community; both blocked into two groups) were used in the stratification to allocate
communities to control or treatment. We explored the balance achieved at baseline for
measured variables which may affect the outcome of interest (E. coli contamination at end-
line) using standardized mean differences between treatment and control estimated in the
R cobalt package (Greifer, 2018). Included variables were those used in the stratification,
time from community centre to hospital (a proxy for remoteness), turbidity and the
baseline measure of E. coli water contamination. Mean differences were standardized using
pooled standard deviations (Fig. 3). Looking at all 120 communities monitored at baseline,
variables appear quite well balanced (all close to or <0.25 pooled standard deviation units).
However, there is less balance between control and treatment at baseline when just the
sites for which we have comparable data for baseline and end-line (i.e., excluding all sites
for which we were not 100% sure that water quality was measured at the same location).
When the baseline conditions for these 83 sites in 47 communities are compared, it is clear
an imbalance has been introduced in a number of variables. In particular, the remaining
control sites had substantially higher E. coli contamination) at baseline and were in more
remote communities.
Statistical analysis
We used generalized linear mixed model (GLMMs) to investigate whether features of
Watershared agreements (e.g., cattle exclusion, absence of faeces) have a measurable
impact on water quality at a site accounting for other predictors. For this we used the
much richer 2015 data. We used the glmmADMB package in R (Fournier et al., 2012;
R Development Core Team, 2014) to produce GLMMs predicting E. coli concentrations,
specifying a negative binomial error structure and log-link. We included the water system
identifier throughout as a random effect, as measurement at an intake and then a tap
supplied by that intake represents repeated measures of the same water system. The unit of
analysis is therefore the water system. We used model selection based upon comparisons
of the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and compared relative goodness of models
through Akaike weighting. We then determined 95% confidence intervals for predictors in
the principal model of interest. For this analysis we used all sites monitored which had a
complete set of predictors, with the exception of a single site where the community collect
water from a river with a catchment size of 9,768 km2, meaning this site is qualitatively
different from all other sites (water systems N = 124). For predictor variable selection
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Figure 3 Balance plot showing the standardized absolute mean differences between control and treat-
ment communities at baseline. Key baseline variables likely to influence end-line microbial water quality
are shown both for the 120 communities where water quality was monitored at baseline, and the subset of
47 communities for which the monitoring location remained the same between baseline and end-line data
collection. The loss of sites resulted in a substantial increase in imbalance for two variables (especially in
baseline E. coli contamination). The dashed line indicates acceptable balance (<0.25 pooled standard devi-
ation units).
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5753/fig-3
we first removed closely correlated predictors and then classified variables we considered
likely to be important in predicting E. coli concentration (Table 1). We associated predictor
data relating to intake features with both intakes and their respective associated taps. We
then produced GLMMs for all purely biophysical traits of sites, while also including all
two-way and three-way interactions between temperature, pH, and salinity (Table S4A).
To determine intervention effectiveness, we then added features that related directly to the
intervention (cattle access, whether the site was in a level 1 Watershared agreement, and
faeces presence) and again conducted model selection based on AIC minimization (See
Table S4B).
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Table 1 Variables hypothesized to be important in predicting E. coli concentration in 2015. Codes are
used in subsequent model selection tables (Tables S4A and S4B).
Variable Code Classification Base level
Site type ST Intake; Tap Intake
Intake category IC Stream; Spring Stream
Sediment disturbance SD Undisturbed; Disturbed Undisturbed
Intake substrate IS Rock only; with sand; with
mud
Rock only
Cattle presence C Absent; Present Absent
Agriculture presence A Absent; Present Absent
Turbidity Tu Continuous; FAU/100 –
Temperature T Continuous –
Salinity S Continuous –
pH pH Continuous –
Cattle access CA Yes; No Yes
Faces presence F Absent; Present in forest;
Present in water or on
stream banks
Absent
Compliant level 1Watershared area ARA None; Intake entirely within
conserved area
None
We used two approaches to explore whether the implementation of Watershared in
treatment communities resulted in an improvement in water quality relative to control
communities. In the first approach (evaluating the difference-in-differences from 2010
and 2015 between treatment and control sites), we only included the subset of sites
where the sample locations remained the same between 2010 and 2015 and the intake
is unambiguously associated with a treatment or control community (site N = 83,
communities N = 47). While we use the term difference-in-differences analysis to refer to
this analysis, we note that we do not use the standard difference–in-differences estimator,
but take a panel approach and include the baseline outcome value as a covariate (Gelman
& Hill, 2007). This approach is considered more appropriate especially if autocorrelation
is low and has greater power (McKenzie, 2012). As the balance check suggested that
the reduction in sites had resulted in a lack of balance in pre-existing contamination
we performed a matched analysis. Sites were matched on the baseline E. coli measure
using genetic matching in the R MatchIt package (Ho et al., 2011). Using the weighting
from this matched data we then estimated a differences-in-differences GLMM with E.
coli concentration in 2015 as the response variable and site treatment status (whether a
site is in a control or treatment community) and 2010 E. coli concentration as potential
predictors. Retention of the 2010 E. coli count controlled for the different pre-existing
levels of contamination within the matched data set. We also included an interaction term
between 2010 E. coli concentration and site treatment status (if this interaction were a
significant predictor, this would represent a significant effect of the intervention on water
quality). Given the different volume of water sampled in 2010 (five ml) and 2015 (20 ml),
we included an offset term of loge(4) in each of the models to ensure equivalence between
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2010 and 2015 E. coli CFU counts. We also included water system as a random effect
to account for the tap and intake measures. This model was fitted using the glmmTMB
package in R (Brooks et al., 2017) as glmmADMB does not accommodate weights. To
account for taps and intakes being connected we included water system as a random effect.
In the second approach (evaluating at end-line only) E. coli concentrations in 2015 for
all sites (siteN = 228, communityN = 116) measured were used (regardless of whether we
had baseline water quality values measured at the identical location). Again the model was
fitted in glmmTMB with site treatment status as the predictor of interest but also including
the water source (spring or stream) and data collection point (tap or intake) to control for
any differences in these. For both analyses we excluded two sites where water was collected
from roofs rather than streams or springs. We accounted for some communities having
more than one water system measured by including water system and community as a
random effect.
To establish whether in practice land use differs between treatment and control
communities, we also determined (for all intakes monitored in 2015 for which data
on cattle access is available) whether relative proportions of intake sites protected from
cattle differed between the treatment and control communities. We tested for a significant
difference using a chi-squared test.
RESULTS
Cattle faeces in water is one of the significant predictors of E. coli
concentration at the local scale
E. coli concentration in 2015 (water systemsN = 124) is significantly predicted by a number
of variables (Fig. 4). The details of model selection can be seen in Table S4A (for purely
biophysical model selection) and Table S4B for model selection including parameters
relating directly to the intervention. Intakes are significantly more contaminated than
taps, sites associated with stream intakes are significantly more contaminated than sites
associatedwith spring intakes, and turbidity and disturbance of the sediment by the research
team during sampling are both also associated with higher recorded contamination. In
terms of variables directly connected to the intervention, the presence of cattle faeces in or
close to the water is a significant predictor of contamination. Although faeces presence in
the wider forest shows a positive trend, it is not significant at 95% CI. Details of the model
can be found in Table S4C.
The intervention had no significant effect on E. coli concentration at
the landscape scale
We analyze the RCT in two ways. In the first (difference-in-differences; Fig. 5) we used
weights derived from genetic matching the communities based on the E. coli count in 2010
and only the sub-sample of communities where we are certain water sampling locations are
the same in 2010 and 2015 (sites N = 83, communities N = 47). The weighting strongly
downweighted two communities (w = 0.19), moderately upweighted nine (w = 1.19),
strongly upweighted one (w = 1.5) and did not change the relative weighting of the
remaining communities. We include E. coli count in 2010 as a predictor to control for


























Figure 4 The effect of site features which predict 2015 E. coli concentration. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence intervals. This shows the results of the most highly supported GLMM (see Tables S4A–S4C for
model selection tables and details of the presented model). Water systems N = 124.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5753/fig-4
sites with naturally higher contamination (e.g., streams rather than springs). Results
from a negative binomial GLM show no significant effect of a site being in a control
or treatment community on E. coli concentration in 2015. This is because there is no
significant interaction between RCT status and E. coli concentration in 2010, meaning
that the rate of change in E. coli concentration between 2010 and 2015 is not significantly
different in sites associated with treatment or control communities.
In the second analysis we analyse E. coli at end-line only (levels in 2015) again using
a negative binomial GLM (sites N = 228, communities N = 116). As we do not have
baseline E. coli counts for all these sites we include important predictors of water quality
from Fig. 4. The results show that while taps had significantly lower contamination than
intakes and springs lower contamination than streams there was no significant effect of
treatment (Fig. 6). Taken together both analyses together show that, using the robust RCT
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Figure 5 RCT difference-in-differences analysis matched on baseline E. coli contamination. This anal-
ysis includes only the subset of communities where the sampling location remained the same between
baseline and end-line (communities N = 47). The model shows no effect of the intervention on microbial
water quality (the error bars on the coefficient ‘difference in difference in E. coli CFU concentration be-
tween 2010 and 2015 between treatment and control sites’ overlaps zero). The coefficients and confidence
intervals are presented in Table S5.
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design and both the baseline and end-line datasets, we did not find a significant effect of
the intervention on E. coli concentration at the landscape scale.
Uptake was low, highly variable and treatment and control
communities do not differ with respect to protection of intakes from
cattle
In treatment communities (where every household was offered the opportunity to enrol
land) a low proportion of land eligible to be enrolled in Watershared agreements was
actually enrolled, and this proportion was highly variable between communities (Fig. 7:
range from 0–18% with a median uptake of 2.5%). There is no significant difference
(N = 129; p= 0.97; chi-squared test) between the number of intakes protected from cattle
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Figure 6 RCT analysis for end-line data only from all communities for which we have end-line data
(communitiesN = 116) controlling for predictors of E. coli contamination. This shows no effect of the
intervention on microbial water quality (the error bars on the coefficient ‘End-line effect of being a treat-
ment community’ overlaps zero). The coefficients and confidence intervals are presented in Table S6.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5753/fig-6
in control and treatment community sites. Water intakes in both control and treatment
communities tend to be protected from cattle (61% and 62% of intakes respectively)
despite only a quarter of intakes being in compliant level 1 areas (Table 2).
DISCUSSION
Did Watershared improve water quality?
We show that presence of cattle faeces in water or on the stream banks results in higher E.
coli contamination at individual sites. This suggests that excluding cattle fromwater sources
(one of the key actionsWatershared seeks to incentivize) can contribute to improving water
quality. This should perhaps not be surprising given that fresh cattle faeces can have more
than 108 kg1 colony forming units (Weaver, Entry & Graves, 2005). However, the presence
of cattle faeces is only one predictor of water quality. Intakes fed by streams were much
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Figure 7 Box plots showing the difference between control and treatment communities in the propor-
tion of eligible land enrolled in level 1Watershared agreements. The data is shown for all communities
for which baseline water quality is available and the subset of communities for which we have a directly
comparable end-line.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5753/fig-7
more contaminated than those fed by springs, as could have been predicted (Howell, Coyne
& Cornelius, 1995;WaterAid, 2013). Indeed, the Millennium Development Goal definition
of an improved water source allows some springs to be considered improved without
further chemical treatment while no stream or river intakes can (Bain et al., 2014b). We
also found that intakes were more heavily contaminated than taps. This suggests that
although the sedimentation and filtration chambers in many of the water systems may not
always be effective, they have at least some positive effect on water quality. It is unsurprising
that turbidity was an important predictor as this is a well-known as a predictor of E. coli
contamination (LeChevallier, Evans & Seidler, 1981).
Despite finding evidence that excluding cattle from riparian forests had a significant
impact on water quality at the local scale, both the RCT analyses (comparing E. coli
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Table 2 Number (and proportion) of intakes visited in 2015 in compliantWatershared agreements








Compliant level 1Watershared conservation agreement (%) 16 (24%) 0 (0%)
Sites with no cattle access (%) 40 (59%) 37 (61%)
contamination between treatment and control communities) showed no evidence of an
effect at the landscape scale.
There is therefore an apparent paradox in that the intervention incentivised (excluding
cattle) does apparently improve water quality but the program has not had an impact at the
landscape scale. It is possible that there has not been sufficient time between implementation
of the intervention and subsequent evaluation for differences to become apparent. Some of
theWatershared areas included in the analysis had been enrolled in the latter part of 2014,
hence in some cases only a few months before the end-line monitoring was undertaken.
It is well known that E. coli can persist in freshwater sediments for long periods of time
(Pachepsky & Shelton, 2011; Cho et al., 2016). However, we argue that features of the way
in which the PES program was implemented in the area meant that it was highly likely that
no difference would be detected between control and treatment.
Firstly, a very low percentage of eligible land was enrolled in Watershared agreements
(the median uptake of enrolled land was 2.5% of eligible land in treatment communities).
In addition, GIS analysis has shown that much of the land which was enrolled could not
influence water quality at the intake or tap because it was situated in a different catchment
(Pynegar, 2018). Livestock-derived E. coli can enter water intakes through a number of
routes including overland flow and movement of groundwater (Oliver et al., 2010), and
not solely through direct deposition which is what the Watershared agreements try to
prevent. The small areas conserved at or above the intakes may well have reduced faeces
presence and so reduced E. coli concentration at these sites. However, upstream or uphill
of these intakes contamination may have continued to enter water bodies through multiple
routes. Instructively, evidence from a 26-year-old conservation area in the community of
La Aguada, near to our study area, shows that despite the 20% of the catchment nearest to
the intake being under conservation with cattle excluded, the water remains contaminated
(Pynegar, 2018).
Secondly, the iteration of the Watershared intervention that we studied did not oblige,
or even provide extra incentives, for landowners to conserve land surrounding or in the
same catchment as monitored intakes. Farmers were free to enrol any land which met the
criteria (forest within 100 m of a stream or spring). The intervention was not spatially
targeted towards areas critical for community water supplies, and in fact only 16 of the 68
water intakes in treatment communities were located inside enrolled and compliant parcels
of land. Also, many communities in the study area had previously excluded cattle from
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water intakes independently of the Watershared program, meaning there is no significant
difference in the proportion of intakes protected from cattle between treatment and control
communities.
Finally, not all the land enrolled in Watershared agreements will represent additional
conservation. There is a large body of evidence showing that adverse participant selection
in PES programs means that a significant proportion of land enrolled would have been
conserved in the absence of the incentives (Börner et al., 2017). There has been concern
about the extent to which conservation funded under the Watershared programme will
represent additional conservation since the early days of the scheme (Robertson & Wunder,
2005; Asquith, Vargas & Wunder, 2008). Best estimates for the Watershared intervention
suggest that only about one third of level 1 agreements have resulted in cattle being excluded
from land which they would have otherwise been using (Bottazzi et al., 2018).
Given the very low uptake of Watershared agreements, the lack of targeting of the land
enrolled, and the fact that (like in any PES programme) not all the land enrolled represents
additional conservation, it is perhaps not surprising that we did not detect an impact of
the intervention on water quality at the landscape scale.
How would Watershared have to change to result in a significant
impact on water quality?
Some of the reasons why Watershared did not produce landscape-scale impacts on water
quality relate to commonly recognised issues in PES implementation. First, the link between
the land use incentivised (the proxy) and the ecosystem service desired is often weak and
poorly understood (Jack, Kousky & Sims, 2008). In the case of Watershared, it is unclear
howmuch land in a catchment would need to be protected, where, and over what timescale,
to obtain a significant improvement in water quality at the landscape or even the catchment
scale. Second, the marginal benefits from service provision (or in this case the land use
proxy for service provision) are highly spatially heterogeneous. Land enrolled directly
upstream of intakes will probably have an effect on monitored water quality while areas
under conservation elsewhere (for example below the water intake) obviously cannot. In
such cases, spatial targeting and differentiated payments would likely increase program
efficiency (Ezzine-de Blas et al., 2016).
Both theory (Persson & Alpízar, 2013) and empirical research on PES programmes
(Arriagada et al., 2009) suggest that low levels of payments result in low uptake. It thus
seems likely that higherWatershared payments would have ensured that a higher proportion
of eligible land was enrolled. It is difficult to directly compare payments in Watershared
with those in related programmes both because of the payment structure (in Watershared
participants are paid an enrolling fee plus a per hectare payment) and because a dollar
is worth more in some countries than others. However the per-hectare payments in
Watershared are certainly lower than other payments for watershed services-type programs
in Latin America: for example Mexico’s PSA-H program pays 27 USD/hectare/year for
primary forest and 36 USD/ha/year for cloud forest (Muñoz Piña et al., 2008) while Costa
Rica’s national PES pays 45 to 163 USD/hectare/year (Wunder, Engel & Pagiola, 2008). The
Ugandan PES program analysed in the RCT by Jayachandran et al. (2017) paid landowners
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28 USD per year per hectare of forest. Bottazzi et al. (2018) show that those signing
Watershared agreements have multiple motivations for doing so. To ensure that areas
most valuable in terms of their potential ecosystem service provision were enrolled would
require targeting. However such targeting would increase the complexity and transaction
costs of the program (Jack, Kousky & Sims, 2008) and poses potential issues in terms of
perceived fairness locally.
There is also likely to be a limit to the impact that livestock exclusion can achieve, and
this will depend on the extent to which faecal contamination derives from other sources
such as wildlife, inadequate sanitation infrastructure, spreading of manure on agricultural
land, or from open defecation. Those involved in promoting similar interventions should
check the extent to which cattle contamination is indeed the driver of microbial water
quality issues in the region, perhaps using genetic testing of E. coli (Carson et al., 2001).
Context-appropriate engineering solutions, such as protection of springs used for drinking
water (Kremer et al., 2011), use of springs rather than streams as drinking water sources,
construction of filtration systems, or introduction of household-level interventions (Clasen
et al., 2007), may be more effective at improving water quality than livestock exclusions.
Such solutions however do not provide the desired co-benefits of the intervention, such
as forest carbon storage, biodiversity conservation, and increases in local incomes. Future
work may aim to combine both conservation and engineering solutions and involve more
direct conservation actions such as purchase or rent of particularly sensitive or important
catchments.
Did the RCT enable robust evaluation of the efficacy of the
Watershared program?
Uptake ofWatershared agreements was very low (the median enrolment of eligible land in
treatment communities was just 2.5%). There was also no targeting of the land enrolled
meaning that little of the land enrolled could impact water quality. Although 24% of the
water intakes in treatment communities were in compliant level 1Watershared agreements,
there is no difference in the percentage of water intakes protected from cattle in treatment
and control communities. This is because communities protect their water intakes formany
reasons and it appears that the intervention was not significantly effective at increasing this
level of protection. Therefore, the conclusion we draw from the RCT analysis about the
efficacy ofWatershared as delivered in this area at influencing water quality at the landscape
scale, could equally have been drawn without a large-scale experiment conducted over 5
years. Theory-based impact evaluation (mapping out the causal chain from inputs to
outcomes and testing the underlying assumptions; White, 2009) could have been just
as effective. The RCT in this case therefore added little to evaluating the impact of this
intervention.
Despite the challenges of implementing this RCT, and observation that the same
conclusions about programme impact could probably have been made without the RCT,
we remain positive about the potential value of RCTs in evaluating the impact of landscape-
scale conservation. There is certainly demand from policy makers and funders for high
quality causal inference about the efficacy of a programme and this is only going to increase.
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We therefore suggest that those interested in quality impact evaluation of landscape-scale
conservation interventions learn from the experience of theWatershared RCT.
Lessons learnt from the experience of the Watershared RCT for
future evaluations of landscape-scale conservation interventions
The randomisation unit needs to be carefully selected
The choice of randomisation unit in an RCT will influence spillover; the phenomenon
in which treatment may affect outcomes in non-treated units resulting in an erroneously
low estimate of treatment effect size (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013). In the case of
the Watershared RCT, randomisation was at the level of the community. However for
evaluating the impact of the program on water quality, a more appropriate randomisation
unit would have been the catchment above the intake supplying water to a community.
The selection of communities as the randomisation unit in this RCT was problematic
because catchments above treatment community water intakes could fall partially within
neighbouring treatment communities (or vice versa); potentially resulting in spillover of
effects between treatment and control communities (Pynegar, 2018). HoweverWatershared
was not designed only to impact water quality but also to reduce deforestation, improve
forest biodiversity and provide socio-economic benefits (Asquith, 2016). Designing an RCT
to evaluate the impact of an intervention on multiple outcomes is inevitably challenging
(Pynegar, 2018). A future RCTof landscape-scale environmentalmanagement interventions
should ensure that the randomisation unit is selected to minimise the risk of spillover. This
may mean an RCT can only effectively evaluate the impact of one or two outcomes at once.
There are difficult decisions to make in selecting sites at which to monitor
outcomes
One of the aims of Watershared was to improve the quality of water consumed in
communities. The decision was therefore made to measure water quality at the intake
and tap serving the largest number of households in each community. Unfortunately, in a
significant number of communities, the water intake serving the community had changed
over the 5 years of the intervention. At such sites, if end-line data were to be taken from
the water system serving the majority of the community, the end-line and baseline data
were inevitably not at the same location. These sites thus had to be excluded from the
difference-in-differences analysis. By conducting the analysis in two ways (our difference-
in-differences analysis for the sub-set of communities where the intake was comparable
across the period and using end-line data only from the full set of communities) we were
able to use as much of the data as possible.
An RCT is not appropriate unless the intervention is well developed
The substantial investment of time and resources in an RCT means that it is only
appropriate when implementers are confident that they have an intervention whose
functioning is reasonably well developed (Pattanayak, 2009; Cartwright, 2010). At earlier
stages of developing an intervention, formative rather than summative impact evaluation
processes might be more appropriate (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004). The implementers
of Watershared had experimented with versions of the program before implementing
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the RCT. However in the event, uptake of Watershared was so low that an RCT was not
an appropriate method of evaluating its impact on water quality at a landscape scale.
Precise levels of uptake cannot be known until the experiment is already set up and the
intervention offered, but pilot work (or analysis of the GIS data showing the location of
enrolled agreements) might have revealed this low uptake and efforts beenmade to increase
it (by raising the payments offered).
Effort should be made to ensure balance between treatment and control in
outcomes of interest
In the Watershared RCT, the allocation to treatment and control achieved quite good
balance in the variables likely to influence E. coli contamination (although when only
the subset of sites for which there is a comparable end-line is considered a significant
imbalance in baseline values for E. coli contamination between treatment and control
was introduced). Of course imperfect balance is a common problem in RCTs and is not
a barrier to valid inference (Senn, 2013). We were able to account for the imbalance in
our difference-in-differences analysis by matching on baseline E. coli values at each site.
However to reduce the chance of random allocation to control and treatment resulting in
an imbalance in important variables, baseline information on the outcome of interest (in
this case E. coli contamination) should be included in the stratification.
Care needs to be taken to avoid contamination of the control
In an ideal RCT, there is zero uptake of the intervention in the control group and consistent
and high uptake in the treatment community. Unfortunately, in many situations the
control is contaminated by information from treatment participants spreading to controls
(Torgerson, 2001). In the Watershared RCT there was non-zero uptake among the control
communities. In this case, the contamination of the control was due to people living in
treatment communities but owning land in treatment communities which they chose to
enrol. This was not noticed during the roll out of the program for two reasons. Firstly,
the community boundaries were not available until they were generated (with substantial
investment) by our research team in 2017. Secondly, for the technicians involved in day-
to-day implementation ofWatershared, the detail of where enrolled land occurred relative
to treatment and control communities was not a priority. In future, we suggest that those
establishing an RCT to evaluate the impact of environmental management interventions
at scale ensure they have sufficient research capacity during the implementation phase to
monitor the RCT while it is in progress so issues such as this could be avoided.
Blinding is unlikely to be fully possible in land-scale scale conservation
interventions
Double blinding is considered best practice in RCTs so neither the researcher nor the
participants know who has been assigned to the treatment or control group (Glennerster
& Takavarasha, 2013). In the case of the Watershared RCT the researchers scoring the E.
coli contamination did not know whether the sample came from a treatment of control
community; so blinding was achieved there. However the participants clearly knew they
were in a control or treatment community. Those allocated to control or treatment may
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have different expectations or show different behaviour or effort simply as a consequence
of being allocated to a control or treatment group (Chassang, Padró i Miquel & Snowberg,
2012). Some authors have claimed that these behavioural effects may be large (Bulte et al.,
2014) but they have not been extensively studied. They should be considered in the design
of any landscape-scale RCT.
CONCLUSIONS
There is global interest in PES because it is seen as an efficient way to provide environmental
outcomes. The effectiveness of PES in achieving its intended outcomes is fundamentally
an empirical question but the quality of the evidence base concerning the delivery of
benefits from PES is mixed. There is therefore substantial interest in robust evaluation of
the effectiveness of PES programs at delivering outcomes. We conclude that this particular
program would require much greater uptake (probably requiring higher payments) and
more intensive targeting (which would increase substantially the transaction costs and
design complexity of the intervention) to have a significant impact on water quality.
However, although this paper presents the results of a Randomised Control Trial (one
of the very few implemented to evaluate the impacts of a conservation intervention at
scale), these same conclusions could have been drawn without the RCT. The low uptake
of the program and the lack of a difference in water intakes protected from cattle between
control and treatment communities make the result of the RCT (no effect of the program
detected at the landscape scale) inevitable. Randomised Control Trials have the potential
to contribute to building the evidence base for understanding the impact of environmental
management approaches such as Payments for Ecosystem Services. However, as evidenced
by theWatershared experience, they are not straightforward to implement in practice. We
hope that by publishing the experience of the Watershared RCT we will encourage future
landscape-scale conservation impact evaluations to improve on the use of this evaluation
approach in conservation.
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